The Lisbon Treaty, What is it Good For?
As of late, there have been numerous attempts by many to categorize the current EU situation as one of disarray and general chaos. While the outlook is not as cheerful as it may have been 10 or arguably five years ago, I'm still rather inclined to believe that the EU has life yet. Certainly, the Treaty of Lisbon has created a basis for the next chapter of EU history to be written, ironically on a subject few have dared to explore in the last 40 years. In this paper, I will argue that the Treaty of Lisbon does very well to advance European Security in three ways; turning the EU into one legal body increasing the efficiency of foreign relations, creating the External Action Service to better place the EU to the rest of the world, and finally putting defense and security in the EU conversation. By putting EU foreign relations and security at a new genesis point, the EU has the potential to craft a new mission of global peace and to preserve the values it has already acquired.
Legal Efficacy; Turning the
EU Whole
The treaty itself begins
to shape EU foreign policy at the very core of its structural level by
condensing all three older pillars of EU governance into one legal body. What
this basically means is that up until the Lisbon Treaty, EU foreign policy
(CFSP) was considered a separate body from all European Communities, as well as
strangely the Police and Judicial Cooperation Pillar. The CFSP's detachment
prior to the Lisbon Treaty created "an uncertain international
status" (Verola) stemming from the lack of a coherent message. On its own,
the CFSP was rather vaguely tasked with trying to encourage member states to
develop similar foreign policy if only to try to streamline interactions with
other member states and most importantly not create unnecessary conflicts.
Clearly, this was in no
way an effective method at actually establishing a foreign policy of any kind.
Although the member states reserved the right to create their own foreign
policies and establish national strategy as they do today, using the CFSP as a
type of registrar for the member states made it a misnomer at best for European
solidarity and security. Although the CFSP was able to try to draw member
states into a coherent European international message, "there [were] no
legal sanctions for failing to comply with common positions" (Hix and
Høyland). By integrating the CFSP into the "single pillar system"
under the Lisbon Treaty, it gives the EU a greater command over determining
common foreign policy, both figurative and practical.
The former comes in the
form of creating a framework for actual policy making and accountability on the
member states, like the solidarity clause which considers an attack on any
member state as an attack on the consolidated EU body. The latter takes shape
in international talks, as the EU is no longer an observer to the United
Nations but is now a member with speaking privileges (Council Spokesperson
Legal Service ESDP Missions, 7/20/2011) as it is one whole legal body. The
streamlining that is made because of the Lisbon treaty is rather immense
compared to the vision of the Maastricht Treaty 10 years ago.
External Action Service: The
Legitimization of EU Foreign Affairs
Perhaps the most controversial
(at least at the moment) aspect of the Lisbon Treaty relies around the creation
of the External Action Service. This separate new institution takes the place
of the old CFSP pillar in the sense that it has many of the original CFSP goals
and responsibilities still apply to the EAS. The difference however is that the
EAS is given through the Lisbon treaty the ability to act as a "diplomatic
service" (Hix & Høyland) which the former CFSP could not, even with
the Amsterdam revisions proposed in 1999. As the EAS is run by an appointed High Representative
directly from the Council under consultation from the Commission, its position
is one that like the CFSP relates to the member states, but still serves the
EU's common interests.
The EAS is therefore a new
understanding, much like the "pillar restructuring", to the
responsibilities of the EU specifically in the area of foreign policy. It is designed
to not open itself up to the same criticism as the CFSP for being too divided
or not as important as the first pillar was (Hobbing, 7/19/2011). Its new
powers clearly move it into the direction of greater autonomy. Proof of this
very fact can be seen in the controversy it has managed to stir in its
bureaucratic infancy. Lady Catherine Ashton who serves as Vice-President of the
Commission as well as High Representative for the EAS has received her fair
share of criticism for not upholding the "right of initiative"
(Verola) aspect of her post [1]
Because she is acting in part
to accommodate the needs of the Council of the EU, her job consists of checking
off with all member states regarding any critical issue, making emergency
situations very difficult to deal with in terms of responding within a given
time frame. An example of this was the backlash she received for not taking a
more publicly active role after the Haiti Earthquake in 2010 (Bork) even though
her interaction with U.S Secretary of State Hillary Clinton advised her to
simply send aid rather than an envoy. Yet that in itself still does outline the
responsibilities to the member states that in some sense hinder the actions of
the EAS. However, I still maintain that the foundation of the EAS, even with
the oversight of the member states is a great leap forward in EU foreign policy
and understanding EU involvement abroad. The EU has a track record of many
international involvements regarding peaceful and humanitarian operations
(Hix), so there is no problem of will.
The problem that does exist is
the public relations problem of not having a main face of EU foreign policy
which plagues most of the EU itself. There are some main advantages to having
created the EAS that will work to reverse this problem. The first comes straight
from the politics involved in choosing the high representative. Because both
the Council and the Commission have a say in deciding the High Representative,
the opportunity for political theatre over a position that will inevitably need
to stick to a common script down the line provides a public relations win for
the whole of the EU, and gives a major boost to the reception of EU foreign
policy amongst those in or outside of the EU. A second advantage is the very
fact that there is now a figurehead at the top of the EAS that can actually be
referred to for any foreign relation problem, specifically any crises that may
arise. The stock of presidents that the EU currently has for the Presidency,
sitting President of the Council, or President of the Commission is acceptable
(not necessarily ideal however) for internal issues that can allow for time to
pass before their resolution (things such as trade or commerce laws).
Foreign policy however needs to
be able to respond much more quickly and with a certain gravitas in order to
claim legitimacy. The EAS helps this need out by creating a framework for all
future foreign relations communications to come out quickly and efficiently.
Much is said about Lady Ashton currently having to be approved by all the member
states before making an announcement and therefore slowing down the process
(Cirtautas, 8/1/2011) but that is because there is very little precedent to
jump off of at the moment. Because the EAS is tasked to package and categorize
common EU foreign policy interests, every outside stimuli adds another piece of
information to the greater common EU knowledge base, making every action after
the other much easier to digest and react to. Unless there are serious
upheavals in member states' governments and ideas regarding foreign policy, the
common EU policy will continue to dictate a general first response on the part
of the EAS.
Beyond Legal Unity
The most striking of the Lisbon
Treaty change is, like most attempts by the EU to gain legitimacy, symbolic in
nature. What the combined efforts of the legal merger of the three Maastricht
Pillars and the creation of the EAS generate is an environment to fit what over
the last decade has become a louder aspect of the EU; combined security
efforts. During the Cold War, European Security never became a great issue
because of NATO's presence and the one clear Russian threat. However, ever
since the Soviet Collapse and the European "military enlightenment"
that was the Kosovo Mission in 1999 (Pinder), the topic of European Defense
became harder to ignore. This is emphasized by the level of commitment every
new mission has received on the part of the EU in terms of sheer numbers of
volunteers sent in, both civilian and military (Keukeleire).
By merging the CFSP into the
rest of the EU, the Lisbon Treaty legally ties foreign relations with security
and defense as one whole body under the communication of the EAS. The result is
a combination of both CFSP and ESDP efforts under one legal entity (Pirozzi
& Sandawi). Although the immediate effects are bureaucratic in nature, the
possibilities that this bond creates for future EU foreign policy is an
enticing and unpredictable development. For the first time the EU can begin to
better articulate its humanitarian missions; more importantly it may see an
initiative that is key to EAS policy and could bolster it with direct
involvement of its security efforts. It also makes the EU more prepared to deal
with conflicts that could possibly arise on Europe's front door like the Arab
Spring or oddly enough territorial rights to the Arctic (Nemitz, 7/18/2011)
which could call upon a simultaneous deployment of both diplomats and
humanitarian forces/ peacekeepers.
The Lisbon Treaty is in no way
however creating a NATO alternative. Although many question its use or identity
in the years after the fall of the Soviet Union (Economist), its existence is
not short lived in the European Defense psyche. The rise of right wing
governments and public sentiments in the member states is an early indication
that NATO will continue to play a large role in regional stability for years to
come. But the EU is now on the path of being able to provide perhaps not a
substitute to NATO but a corollary EU defense policy similar to that of the Pleven
and Fouchet plans (Keukeleire).
But is it a Real Change from
Business as Usual?
So the Lisbon Treaty does
manage to make certainly significant changes to the previous foreign policy and
defense structure of the EU. But the worrying prospect for most is not so much
that a change has occurred, but rather the way in which it has occurred.
Effectively merging the EAS and ESDP under a common directive is a good idea;
more consolidation leads to more efficacy. But only to a certain extent. The
EAS functions much like the U.S State Department (as a diplomatic wing) while
the ESDP functions instead like the U.S Department of Defense (as a military
wing). Although connected, both are departments that require huge amounts of
dedication and effort just to be run separately; the merging of the pillars
under the Lisbon Treaty then seems to have actually caused more strain on both
wings because of a quantifiable lack of leadership and direction because only
one High Representative chairs both.
If the Lisbon Treaty really was
aiming for efficacy and streamlining, a more rational method of combining forces
could have been to still create an EAS that focused on centralizing European
foreign policy by overseeing both the former CFSP and ESDP, without having to actively
chair both. The pillars as they were could have been given separate legal
status so that they could effectively have the same powers they do now, but
maintain the internal structure and policies that they had beforehand. With
enhanced powers, enhanced legal status, and an office from the Commission that
worked to consolidate the work and not the agencies, the Lisbon Treaty could
have avoided many hassles that are beginning to appear after its inception.
One Must Learn to Walk
Before Running
The question of efficacy though
is perhaps skewed by a difference in understanding what the Lisbon Treaty was
created to do. Undoubtedly the Lisbon Treaty sought efficacy, but there is a
stronger case to believe that it sought progress. The merging of the "two
pillars" was not a decision stemming from luxury or governmental
aesthetics, nor was it simply to give legal status to a wing of foreign
affairs. It clearly was an attempt to promote a rethinking of European foreign
affairs and security by showing that the two disciplines were not and should
not be so far apart. Again, the discussion currently relates around the idea of
EU collapse or EU irrelevancy.
These problems are not solved
by marginally increasing powers to certain facets of government; they are
solved by approaching the question of government in a different light. When
Keukeleire entitles his chapter with the words "From Taboo to a Spearhead
of EU Foreign Policy", he is not using rhetoric to make his article stand
out, he is describing a recent reality. In order for the EU to remain relevant,
it must begin to play a much more active and centralized role on the world
stage and that particular endeavor begins by creating a face for the EU; the
EAS. Some questions about Lady Ashton and her leadership still remain. She
perhaps has acted as a catalyst for the argument that the position as head of
the EAS is too overreaching and too overbearing for one individual by her
missteps (EU) and misrepresentations in the media (EUX.TV). But her less than
perfect performance can be simply attributed to the political choice made to
appoint her by not the Commission but instead the 27 member states who would
rather see the EAS limited in centralizing foreign affairs and defense (BBC).
Regardless, the structure put
in place by the Treaty of Lisbon is one that is as symbolic as it is
progressive. For the EU, the coupling of the former CFSP and ESDP was seen as
much more necessary than organizational efficacy. Historically speaking, many
of the current EU institutions began as weakened versions of the current lot,
once destined to be either irrelevant or short lived. But like the Parliament
and the European Court of Justice, the EAS will be justified and then later
expanded to accommodate the new responsibilities.
What is the Lisbon Treaty
Good For? Why, the Future of the Whole EU.
The Treaty of Lisbon did not
mean to impose a "silver bullet" for the foreign affairs question of
the EU. Treading on the grounds of foreign affairs and security has always been
a difficult affair when negotiating with the member states. Their claims of
sovereignty are still very loud and rarely challenged by any EU institution
(Chmielewski), making solidarity in any EU centralization effort very
difficult. It instead was chartered to introduce this new way of thinking, and
most importantly legally setting it as precedent that the EU was going to take
foreign affairs and security as a more central mission than before. Because of
this, even the structural setbacks of the Lisbon Treaty do not hinder it from
being a true step forward for European integration.
Works Cited
Ashton, C. (2011). A
world built on co-operation, sovereignty, democracy and stability. Corvinus
University. Budapest: European Union.
BBC . (2009, November
20). EU foreign head dismisses critics. Retrieved August 5, 2011, from
BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8367589.stm
Bork, J. (2011). The
European Union - A General Introduction to the EU. Brussels: EU Commission.
Chmielewski, K.
(2011, August 4). Visit to the Polish Permanent Presidency 2011. (U. 2.
Program, & A. Regio, Interviewers)
Council Spokespoerson
Legal Service ESDP Missions. (2011). Discussion about the Council of the EU.
Brussels: Council of the EU.
EUXTV. (2009,
November 20). Ashton Grilled by Media on Qualifications as EU Foreign Minister.
Brussels, Belgium.
Hix, S., &
Hoyland, B. (2011). The Political System of the European Union. New
York: Palgrave McMillan.
Hobbing, P. (2011).
Brussels Basics. EU Symposium 2011. Brussels.
Keukeleire, S.
(2010). European Security and Defense Policy: From Taboo to a Spearhead of EU
Foreign Policy. In F. Bindi, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (pp.
51-72). Washington D.C: The Brookings Institute.
Nemitz, P. (2011).
Integrated Maritime Policy. EU Symposium 2011. Brussels.
Pinder, J., &
Usherwood, S. (2007). The European Union: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford:
Oxford Press New York.
Pirozzi, N., &
Sandawi, S. (2008). Five Years of ESDP in Action: Operations, Trends,
Shortfalls". European Security Review, 39, pp. 14-17.
Verola, N. (2010). The New EU
Foreign Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon. In F. Bindi, The Foreign Policy
of the European Union (pp. 41-50). Washington D.C: The Brookings
Institution.
[1] The “right of initiative”
basically prescribes a vaguely based right of autonomy within EAS proceedings
and policy making. This grants the independence that the EAS needs in order to
be a leading force of foreign affairs.
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