There are some things that truly perplex me when I have a free moment to think. Things like quantum physics, figuring out the true nature of our morals, or how to operate the copier (it's never the tray you think it is). Then, there are things that still perplex, but add on top a layer of question begging that stems from the lack of obvious action. Put more colloquially, these things cause that "Hold on, what?" thought that we've all had at one point in our lives. To me, inaction in Syria by the Western World creates that exact thought. By avoiding the Syrian issue, the West is gambling progress that an entire region of the world has made to join the ranks of internationally responsible democracies in the last two years or so, as well as allowing a human tragedy of great proportions.
Now, I could easily begin to list the atrocities going on in Syria at the moment; the shelling of Homs, the snipers on neighborhood rooftops, the starvation caused by army encirclements, the numbers of truly unnecessary deaths caused by lack of basic medical equipment. Although it appears that I have, it seems obvious that this type of argument as compelling as it may be is not the one policy makers are waiting to hear. If that was the case, al-Assad would be long gone by now. Sadly, he is not, and we have to try to find another type of argument to try to convince Western governments otherwise.
If a humanitarian crisis is not motivating enough to mobilize counter-Assad measures, then perhaps a strategic view is needed. Let's first think about what type of involvement we would be dealing with should Syria become a theatre of war. I do not think that anyone in this conversation is truly proposing to begin a full fledged invasion of Syrian land. Doing that would not only drag Western powers into a third predominantly Muslim sovereign nation in a span of 15 years (which, even under justified humanitarian grounds, would not bode well for impressions of the Western World), but also simply be too costly in both resources and blood (I have no doubt that a full offensive into Syria would devolve into a long guerilla campaign on the part of the Syrian forces; that lesson was learned in Iraq the hard way). This is where the Libyan model comes into play, albeit with a few tweaks.
The reason why the Benghazi rebels were able to push against Quadaffi's forces was because NATO forces acted as the Navy and Air Force of the rebels, effectively leveling the playing field for that struggle and allowing for a revolution of will instead of a revolution of force to happen. Let us not forget that revolution in modern times is much harder to achieve against a violently repressive government than it was in the hay-day of the first nationalist revolutions. In countries with strongmen in charge, the prospect of non-violent protest is out of the question, and the armaments that dictators have to remain in power greatly overpower whatever force a civilian contingent can muster.
That being said, the same principle can be applied to Syrian rebels; however, there is one caveat. NATO intervened militarily because Quadaffi not only encircled Benghazi, but he also actively bombed his own people with airstrikes. As far as Syria is concerned, only the former condition has been fulfilled. Perhaps lessons were learned from Libya that the real line to not be crossed is the one where you bomb your own people, so al-Assad is relying on random mortaring and artillery shelling to achieve the same effect. But it seems weird to think that so long as shelling of civilians is done with artillery pieces and not airplanes, it justifies the act of shelling civilians. If Western powers enacted a no flight zone like they did over Libya, begin to neutralize Syrian communications systems, and eventually strike hard military targets, the lack of a true rebel stronghold could vanish much sooner than expected. With room to breathe, even the most dug in rebels (who are predominantly army defectors) begin to have the chance to build a decent resistance. With a decent resistance comes a decent push-back, and a decent push-back becomes the front lines, far away from civilians. This would then have two outcomes; either the revolution gains steam and support and is legitimized byways of international recognition (already supplied to foreign based opposition organizations) and violence against the Syrian army, or it does not, and al-Assad is rightfully maintaining the territorial integrity of his country (albeit in a very ruthless manner).
That is the "how" and I'm sure you are dieing to find out the "why". I should stress that I chose to tackle the "how" question first in order to at least make it feasible to think about the possibility of intervening in Syria. With that in tow, we can begin to analyze what intervention might mean in terms of pros and cons. The payout for Western involvement is simple 1) greater recognition in the Arab world as Western powers living up to the code of democracy, 2) a chance to develop a new partnership with a state that right now sits in the opposite camp 3) establish a new precedent for how to plan, operate, and execute forceful humanitarian crisis responses by proving that what happened in Libya was not a fluke.
The first is a goal that many have talked about having, but not really have prescribed anything more elaborate than "do well for Arab countries". If trust and respect is what the Western world would like from Arab governments (and perhaps more importantly the people of those nations), then a sincere attempt at building trust by sticking to one's principles is a good start. To act in Libya where it was simple and not act in Syria where it is difficult portrays the Western world as weak-minded, highly greedy, and very contradictory to those who know better. This now changes from an argument of saving face, as it were, to one of strategy.
For a system that survives based on the health and stability of democracies in the world, to simply forego the opportunity to add another ally in a key part of the world is highly irrational. I really hope that this will not be met with retorts or judgments about using the Syrian crisis to further the West's own security; again the humanitarian crisis is what draws us into Syria, not the prospects of changing a part of the world. However, it would be foolish to simply ignore the possibility of a win-win situation between a finally democratic Syria and a cooperative power in the Middle East for Western powers.
This brings me to my final point, and perhaps the most distinct in most regards. For now, the major block to action in Syria has been a lack of complete international approval of action within the state. Specifically, blocks by Russia and China have been the biggest speed bumps to supporting democratically inclined rebels. The fact of the matter is though that this Syrian conflict has re-drawn the lines between world powers that only recently had just begun to reacclimatize themselves economically. A mission in Syria would have to be one aimed at helping democracy come about. Therefore, it can only be assumed that only truly democratic countries would be interested in having it happen. We know that Russia and China are not by any means perfectly democratic. So my question is the following; what good is the approval from non-democratic countries to allow for democratically backed intervention? Better yet, what good is that approval when it comes from countries who have historically exploited good will from democratic countries to achieve their own interests?
The answer, if you haven't already guessed is none; asking for Russian and Chinese approval to install democracy in Syria would be like McDonald's asking a PETA member what his/her opinion of the Big Mac is. Now, I understand that a UN humanitarian mission is what is being asked for in this circumstance, but there is no reason to think that NATO and the member forces could not handle that task with the help of the Arab League members that have already ostracized the Syrian regime. Intervention in Syria can strike a new precedent for international intervention that is less international but far more effective and quick to respond. There needs to be a precedent for selective communitarian intervention where democratic countries are not afraid to go to the aid of oppressed peoples in the world who are actively seeking help.
This of course is just a scratch on the surface that is the Syrian conflict and how the West can act on it. Undoubtedly there are still questions as to what Iran plans to do, as well as the threat of terror groups moving in to sweep up either physical or political vacuums in Syria. Those unfortunately need stacks of intelligence to be able to completely sort out (Department of Defense, if you want to make those documents available, be my guest). I am prepared to say though that unless Iran has some ace up its sleeve to make any intervention far too costly for both the intervening forces and the Syrian rebels, the odds stack up in favor of a selective communitarian intervention as described before. Because let's face it, international cooperation needs one major element; cooperation. If you want to have a system that is built on the trust and force of grouped powers, you must be ready and willing to act with the powers who will follow you in the genuine hopes of ending the suffering of others. Otherwise, that dream becomes hostage to the whim of the players of the chaotic international game who choose to sit idly by.
