For weeks now, North Korea has been ratcheting up the ante along the 38th parallel, trying to entice conflict on the Korean peninsula for the first time in over half a century. Their actions are best characterized by the familiar situation of one sibling putting his or her finger very close to the face of another sibling, but not quite touching. The fact is that unlike more recent North Korean infractions onto the peace of the Korean peninsula, this particular one is indeed much more complex. That complexity is what is now creating a heightened worry among everyone, public and private included, that is unmatched by more feeble North Korean rhetorical offences of the past.
My guess is that the reason why this is is because unlike most other scenarios, there isn't a consensus between different international theories about what North Korea actually wants to accomplish and what it is willing to do. In most other cases, although there will always be different ideas about what to make of specific developments, something will meet the light of day and either endorse one theory outright or eliminate another; one way or another, a theory becomes "more correct" than another.
Below I list the three main theories of international relations and show exactly where this lack of consensus comes from.
Realism: Realists secretly love this scenario, there is a rogue state on the loose and force looks like a sure-fire way to stop it. These military drills that the North is conducting are being matched or even upshown by coalition forces in the South, making the realist more confident in his or her understanding of the issue. Of course, nobody hopes for war, but the realist expects it as part of human nature, so jockying for position of greatest power on the peninsula is right up the realist's alley. The only issue here is what to make of North Korean rationality here. If they are indeed a "Yahoo State" as Waltz would say, then there is no reasoning to be had, and so the threats gain legitimacy.
If North Korea is instead a "reasonable state" then all this rhetoric, while still comparably elevated to that of the past, would never account for an attack against a much stronger and larger enemy force. If North Korea launched any sort of nuclear device in any direction, it would constitute war, and while the North Korean army is large and is presumably well trained (that is, if they haven't wasted all their time learning to march instead of learning to fight) it is not suited to engage a multifaceted air, sea and ground assault on the part of the Americans and the South Koreans. Of course, this is the moment when China enters the picture. What if there is a repeat of 1950? Chances are, if worst truly did come to worst, China would elect to stay out of the fight. There are two reasons for this. The first is that there is a line of communication between Beijing and Washington D.C., whereas in 1950 there was no such thing. To boot, there is also no Gen. MacArthur to take the fight all the way to the Chinese border. Any infraction China would sense would be talked about over diplomatic channels.
Although possible skirmishes onto Chinese soil could take place as remnants of a North Korean regime fight for their lives, it seems more probable that the United States and South Korea would worry more about proper nation rebuilding and perhaps even mount a human rights campaign to serve the discouraged Northeners who have had no choice but to suffer under North Korean rule. The second reason why China probably wouldn't intervene is because just as there is no Gen. MacArthur, there is no Mao Zedong. The world wide communist cause was broken long ago, and China while still officially communist, is looking more and more willing to dive into capitalism. Trade aside, there is no pull of communistic solidarity to be had here, apart from perhaps a veto on a UN resolution. As far as intervention is concerned, that might be as far as China will get.
Liberalism: Neo-liberals look at the North Korea issue and ask themselves which side of history they would rather be on. The side that treated North Korea like any other belligerent nation and continued to increase international pressure, or the side that only committed to intervention if based on a multilateral, international approach. When it comes down to making that decision, both sides are going to have to evaluate very separate factors. The first option dictates that the U.S find more allies in its isolation of North Korea. That all depends on what the U.S is willing to let go, because most of the countries left on a list of possible allies against North Korea are precisely in that category due to either anti-American sentiments or the very rare but still present pro-North Korean sentiment. What these specific concessions might be are indeed still a mystery simply because the dynamics of those diplomatic talks are unknown to the world outside corresponding state embassies. However, we could make some guesses.
With China, trade concessions are most likely still off the table. Issues of product integrity, copyright infringement, data tampering, and internal political risks are unfortunately all at play in allowing entry of Chinese products, regardless of how founded or unfounded each specific claim is. That being said, there is still room for bargaining on emissions talks (of which there are none when it comes to Sino-American relations) or on state borrowing issues, although over the long term those issues favor the Chinese side of the negotiating table. While Chinese bartering may be out of the question, could Russia come into play? We've already seen this year and last that Russia is not willing to allow the U.S to play the part of the "knight in shining armor" when it comes to international intervention on grounds of human rights violations or (i.e Syria) but preventing war could garner a different response. Keep in mind that Russia has helped or at least facilitated U.S multilateral operations in the past, Afghanistan supply routing being the most recent example.
So it isn't completely outrageous to believe that some sort of monitoring or neighborhood watching couldn't be asked of Russia, so long as the justification was not of direct intervention just for intervention's sake. Going back to the other side, the one that wanted to focus on multilateral intervention, that has one specific issue; which countries with diplomatic missions to Pyongyang will be for it and which countries will be against it. Almost all of Europe has some form of diplomatic mission with North Korea, meaning it leaves the EU in a bit of a predicament, not to mention its already established issues with creating a comprehensive EU foreign policy. Meanwhile, key American partners like Mexico, Brazil and Poland would all lose diplomatic standing with a country they deem worthy of having diplomacy with. The possibilities here are unfortunately infinite so finding an answer is difficult at this stage, but it is still an issue that needs addressing.
Critical Theory/Constructivism: This is easily the most complicated of the three theories available, not for the theory's fault, but rather because of the massive amounts of variables that need to be accounted for in order to even begin to make sense of a North Korean threat. First, there is the issue of figuring out where the North Korean people are left in this scenario. Nobody really knows for sure whether or not North Koreans truly love their country as much as North Korean state media tries to make it seem. This is because it's difficult to exit out of duress in order to make a liable complaint against a tyrannical government. So if violence were to overtake the North, it would be a crap-shoot as to what to expect from the North Korean populace. Another issue constructivists would have to deal with is what South Koreans would have to make of all this. Would they agree with chancing nuclear war? Would they even be willing to be involved in a war at all? What about Japan, would they feel dragged into a conflict they were not looking for? If that was the case what would be the ramifications of it all?
Moving away from the question of civilians, another issue that pops up is what to do with the rest of the world. This situation is one that could very easily be spun to look like "another step in the history of American 'colonialization'" if the United States does succeed in a military advance. That is a public relations mine simply waiting for the United States in this day and age. While it may simply be a hindrance on the grassroots level, if the idea is picked up in the United Nations it could do some serious damage to any sort of multilateral effort if one exists. In terms of preventing any sort of conflict, constructivists have one ace up their sleeve; a gap between North Korean possible losses and South Korean possible losses.
It is rather evident that South Korea has more to lose than North Korea when it comes to a direct confrontation, and while a successful South Korean incursion would eliminate a nuclear threat, putting a dependable economy and thriving cultural growth as collateral might scare off many. Politically speaking, it would be a hard sell to many South Koreans to engage in war with the North, regardless of spin. On the other hand you have a North Korean regime whose people are terribly subjugated and whose government has not shown any sort of care or responsibility for their well-being; essentially, North Korea has nothing to lose if it is indeed hellbent on following their dream of Korean unification under their flag. This is an issue for the constructivist because only one country, South Korea, plays with along with the constructivist's game, whereas North Korea simply does not give enough details about what sort of ideas are being pressed and which are being worked over to accurately make a prediction about conflict or at the very least be able to react to it.
As you can see, the three major theories up here are wrought with shortfalls. This of course is typical of most IR scenarios, but the fact that none of these three theories can either complement each-other to fill in the gaps and create a hybrid-theory as it were is what makes the North Korean issue difficult to say the least. On top of that, there is the "mad-man" issue with North Korea. That is to say that their secrecy and their supposed lunacy makes good news sound improbable and bad news sound imminent.
It is difficult to explain exactly why that is. It could be that there is little intelligence to go off of so natural cynicism takes over when dealing with international security issues. It could also be that because the Kim Jong Un regime is so much more effervescent than his father's that people are generally drawn towards being hostile from the get-go and leaving some of their reason at the door. It could even be due to an inclination to believe that there are really people in the world who are evil do-ers, control states with access to a nuclear arsenal and have a multitude of shark tanks in gold-laden halls. Whatever the reason, this more hostile North Korea has received a more thorough response than its more recent predecessor. I am no Pangloss, but I do believe that things happen for a reason.
Not a divine reason, but a reason nonetheless. It could be because nobody has been able to strap down a reasonable course of action for North Korea, or it could be that there really is some sort of intelligence that is much more indicative of North Korean hostilities than other times before this. Whatever the case, the best ally in trying to figure out this issue is time. This is a hollow prescription, I grant that, but short of a divine intelligence miracle, it is the most promising one. With time we will be able to tell if North Korea is just sabre-rattling or if it is absolutely serious. Although the latter will be cutting it close, the information necessary will not come in one swoop, rather it will escalate as the tension does. At that point there will be the information necessary to put the issue to rest, hopefully without any military involvement.
My guess is that the reason why this is is because unlike most other scenarios, there isn't a consensus between different international theories about what North Korea actually wants to accomplish and what it is willing to do. In most other cases, although there will always be different ideas about what to make of specific developments, something will meet the light of day and either endorse one theory outright or eliminate another; one way or another, a theory becomes "more correct" than another.
Below I list the three main theories of international relations and show exactly where this lack of consensus comes from.
Realism: Realists secretly love this scenario, there is a rogue state on the loose and force looks like a sure-fire way to stop it. These military drills that the North is conducting are being matched or even upshown by coalition forces in the South, making the realist more confident in his or her understanding of the issue. Of course, nobody hopes for war, but the realist expects it as part of human nature, so jockying for position of greatest power on the peninsula is right up the realist's alley. The only issue here is what to make of North Korean rationality here. If they are indeed a "Yahoo State" as Waltz would say, then there is no reasoning to be had, and so the threats gain legitimacy.
If North Korea is instead a "reasonable state" then all this rhetoric, while still comparably elevated to that of the past, would never account for an attack against a much stronger and larger enemy force. If North Korea launched any sort of nuclear device in any direction, it would constitute war, and while the North Korean army is large and is presumably well trained (that is, if they haven't wasted all their time learning to march instead of learning to fight) it is not suited to engage a multifaceted air, sea and ground assault on the part of the Americans and the South Koreans. Of course, this is the moment when China enters the picture. What if there is a repeat of 1950? Chances are, if worst truly did come to worst, China would elect to stay out of the fight. There are two reasons for this. The first is that there is a line of communication between Beijing and Washington D.C., whereas in 1950 there was no such thing. To boot, there is also no Gen. MacArthur to take the fight all the way to the Chinese border. Any infraction China would sense would be talked about over diplomatic channels.
Although possible skirmishes onto Chinese soil could take place as remnants of a North Korean regime fight for their lives, it seems more probable that the United States and South Korea would worry more about proper nation rebuilding and perhaps even mount a human rights campaign to serve the discouraged Northeners who have had no choice but to suffer under North Korean rule. The second reason why China probably wouldn't intervene is because just as there is no Gen. MacArthur, there is no Mao Zedong. The world wide communist cause was broken long ago, and China while still officially communist, is looking more and more willing to dive into capitalism. Trade aside, there is no pull of communistic solidarity to be had here, apart from perhaps a veto on a UN resolution. As far as intervention is concerned, that might be as far as China will get.
Liberalism: Neo-liberals look at the North Korea issue and ask themselves which side of history they would rather be on. The side that treated North Korea like any other belligerent nation and continued to increase international pressure, or the side that only committed to intervention if based on a multilateral, international approach. When it comes down to making that decision, both sides are going to have to evaluate very separate factors. The first option dictates that the U.S find more allies in its isolation of North Korea. That all depends on what the U.S is willing to let go, because most of the countries left on a list of possible allies against North Korea are precisely in that category due to either anti-American sentiments or the very rare but still present pro-North Korean sentiment. What these specific concessions might be are indeed still a mystery simply because the dynamics of those diplomatic talks are unknown to the world outside corresponding state embassies. However, we could make some guesses.
With China, trade concessions are most likely still off the table. Issues of product integrity, copyright infringement, data tampering, and internal political risks are unfortunately all at play in allowing entry of Chinese products, regardless of how founded or unfounded each specific claim is. That being said, there is still room for bargaining on emissions talks (of which there are none when it comes to Sino-American relations) or on state borrowing issues, although over the long term those issues favor the Chinese side of the negotiating table. While Chinese bartering may be out of the question, could Russia come into play? We've already seen this year and last that Russia is not willing to allow the U.S to play the part of the "knight in shining armor" when it comes to international intervention on grounds of human rights violations or (i.e Syria) but preventing war could garner a different response. Keep in mind that Russia has helped or at least facilitated U.S multilateral operations in the past, Afghanistan supply routing being the most recent example.
So it isn't completely outrageous to believe that some sort of monitoring or neighborhood watching couldn't be asked of Russia, so long as the justification was not of direct intervention just for intervention's sake. Going back to the other side, the one that wanted to focus on multilateral intervention, that has one specific issue; which countries with diplomatic missions to Pyongyang will be for it and which countries will be against it. Almost all of Europe has some form of diplomatic mission with North Korea, meaning it leaves the EU in a bit of a predicament, not to mention its already established issues with creating a comprehensive EU foreign policy. Meanwhile, key American partners like Mexico, Brazil and Poland would all lose diplomatic standing with a country they deem worthy of having diplomacy with. The possibilities here are unfortunately infinite so finding an answer is difficult at this stage, but it is still an issue that needs addressing.
Critical Theory/Constructivism: This is easily the most complicated of the three theories available, not for the theory's fault, but rather because of the massive amounts of variables that need to be accounted for in order to even begin to make sense of a North Korean threat. First, there is the issue of figuring out where the North Korean people are left in this scenario. Nobody really knows for sure whether or not North Koreans truly love their country as much as North Korean state media tries to make it seem. This is because it's difficult to exit out of duress in order to make a liable complaint against a tyrannical government. So if violence were to overtake the North, it would be a crap-shoot as to what to expect from the North Korean populace. Another issue constructivists would have to deal with is what South Koreans would have to make of all this. Would they agree with chancing nuclear war? Would they even be willing to be involved in a war at all? What about Japan, would they feel dragged into a conflict they were not looking for? If that was the case what would be the ramifications of it all?
Moving away from the question of civilians, another issue that pops up is what to do with the rest of the world. This situation is one that could very easily be spun to look like "another step in the history of American 'colonialization'" if the United States does succeed in a military advance. That is a public relations mine simply waiting for the United States in this day and age. While it may simply be a hindrance on the grassroots level, if the idea is picked up in the United Nations it could do some serious damage to any sort of multilateral effort if one exists. In terms of preventing any sort of conflict, constructivists have one ace up their sleeve; a gap between North Korean possible losses and South Korean possible losses.
It is rather evident that South Korea has more to lose than North Korea when it comes to a direct confrontation, and while a successful South Korean incursion would eliminate a nuclear threat, putting a dependable economy and thriving cultural growth as collateral might scare off many. Politically speaking, it would be a hard sell to many South Koreans to engage in war with the North, regardless of spin. On the other hand you have a North Korean regime whose people are terribly subjugated and whose government has not shown any sort of care or responsibility for their well-being; essentially, North Korea has nothing to lose if it is indeed hellbent on following their dream of Korean unification under their flag. This is an issue for the constructivist because only one country, South Korea, plays with along with the constructivist's game, whereas North Korea simply does not give enough details about what sort of ideas are being pressed and which are being worked over to accurately make a prediction about conflict or at the very least be able to react to it.
As you can see, the three major theories up here are wrought with shortfalls. This of course is typical of most IR scenarios, but the fact that none of these three theories can either complement each-other to fill in the gaps and create a hybrid-theory as it were is what makes the North Korean issue difficult to say the least. On top of that, there is the "mad-man" issue with North Korea. That is to say that their secrecy and their supposed lunacy makes good news sound improbable and bad news sound imminent.
It is difficult to explain exactly why that is. It could be that there is little intelligence to go off of so natural cynicism takes over when dealing with international security issues. It could also be that because the Kim Jong Un regime is so much more effervescent than his father's that people are generally drawn towards being hostile from the get-go and leaving some of their reason at the door. It could even be due to an inclination to believe that there are really people in the world who are evil do-ers, control states with access to a nuclear arsenal and have a multitude of shark tanks in gold-laden halls. Whatever the reason, this more hostile North Korea has received a more thorough response than its more recent predecessor. I am no Pangloss, but I do believe that things happen for a reason.
Not a divine reason, but a reason nonetheless. It could be because nobody has been able to strap down a reasonable course of action for North Korea, or it could be that there really is some sort of intelligence that is much more indicative of North Korean hostilities than other times before this. Whatever the case, the best ally in trying to figure out this issue is time. This is a hollow prescription, I grant that, but short of a divine intelligence miracle, it is the most promising one. With time we will be able to tell if North Korea is just sabre-rattling or if it is absolutely serious. Although the latter will be cutting it close, the information necessary will not come in one swoop, rather it will escalate as the tension does. At that point there will be the information necessary to put the issue to rest, hopefully without any military involvement.
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