Nobody Knows; Why it's Theories, not North Korean sabres, that Korea is in Crisis

For weeks now, North Korea has been ratcheting up the ante along the 38th parallel, trying to entice conflict on the Korean peninsula for the first time in over half a century. Their actions are best characterized by the familiar situation of one sibling putting his or her finger very close to the face of another sibling, but not quite touching. The fact is that unlike more recent North Korean infractions onto the peace of the Korean peninsula, this particular one is indeed much more complex. That complexity is what is now creating a heightened worry among everyone, public and private included, that is unmatched by more feeble North Korean rhetorical offences of the past.

My guess is that the reason why this is is because unlike most other scenarios, there isn't a consensus between different international theories about what North Korea actually wants to accomplish and what it is willing to do. In most other cases, although there will always be different ideas about what to make of specific developments, something will meet the light of day and either endorse one theory outright or eliminate another; one way or another, a theory becomes "more correct" than another. 

Below I list the three main theories of international relations and show exactly where this lack of consensus comes from.

Realism: Realists secretly love this scenario, there is a rogue state on the loose and force looks like a sure-fire way to stop it. These military drills that the North is conducting are being matched or even upshown by coalition forces in the South, making the realist more confident in his or her understanding of the issue. Of course, nobody hopes for war, but the realist expects it as part of human nature, so jockying for position of greatest power on the peninsula is right up the realist's alley. The only issue here is what to make of North Korean rationality here. If they are indeed a "Yahoo State" as Waltz would say, then there is no reasoning to be had, and so the threats gain legitimacy. 

If North Korea is instead a "reasonable state" then all this rhetoric, while still comparably elevated to that of the past, would never account for an attack against a much stronger and larger enemy force. If North Korea launched any sort of nuclear device in any direction, it would constitute war, and while the North Korean army is large and is presumably well trained (that is, if they haven't wasted all their time learning to march instead of learning to fight) it is not suited to engage a multifaceted air, sea and ground assault on the part of the Americans and the South Koreans. Of course, this is the moment when China enters the picture. What if there is a repeat of 1950? Chances are, if worst truly did come to worst, China would elect to stay out of the fight. There are two reasons for this. The first is that there is a line of communication between Beijing and Washington D.C., whereas in 1950 there was no such thing. To boot, there is also no Gen. MacArthur to take the fight all the way to the Chinese border. Any infraction China would sense would be talked about over diplomatic channels. 

Although possible skirmishes onto Chinese soil could take place as remnants of a North Korean regime fight for their lives, it seems more probable that the United States and South Korea would worry more about proper nation rebuilding and perhaps even mount a human rights campaign to serve the discouraged Northeners who have had no choice but to suffer under North Korean rule. The second reason why China probably wouldn't intervene is because just as there is no Gen. MacArthur, there is no Mao Zedong. The world wide communist cause was broken long ago, and China while still officially communist, is looking more and more willing to dive into capitalism. Trade aside, there is no pull of communistic solidarity to be had here, apart from perhaps a veto on a UN resolution. As far as intervention is concerned, that might be as far as China will get.

Liberalism: Neo-liberals look at the North Korea issue and ask themselves which side of history they would rather be on. The side that treated North Korea like any other belligerent nation and continued to increase international pressure, or the side that only committed to intervention if based on a multilateral, international approach. When it comes down to making that decision, both sides are going to have to evaluate very separate factors. The first option dictates that the U.S find more allies in its isolation of North Korea. That all depends on what the U.S is willing to let go, because most of the countries left on a list of possible allies against North Korea are precisely in that category due to either anti-American sentiments or the very rare but still present pro-North Korean sentiment. What these specific concessions might be are indeed still a mystery simply because the dynamics of those diplomatic talks are unknown to the world outside corresponding state embassies. However, we could make some guesses. 

With China, trade concessions are most likely still off the table. Issues of product integrity, copyright infringement, data tampering, and internal political risks are unfortunately all at play in allowing entry of Chinese products, regardless of how founded or unfounded each specific claim is. That being said, there is still room for bargaining on emissions talks (of which there are none when it comes to Sino-American relations) or on state borrowing issues, although over the long term those issues favor the Chinese side of the negotiating table. While Chinese bartering may be out of the question, could Russia come into play? We've already seen this year and last that Russia is not willing to allow the U.S to play the part of the "knight in shining armor" when it comes to international intervention on grounds of human rights violations or (i.e Syria) but preventing war could garner a different response. Keep in mind that Russia has helped or at least facilitated U.S multilateral operations in the past, Afghanistan supply routing being the most recent example. 

So it isn't completely outrageous to believe that some sort of monitoring or neighborhood watching couldn't be asked of Russia, so long as the justification was not of direct intervention just for intervention's sake. Going back to the other side, the one that wanted to focus on multilateral intervention, that has one specific issue; which countries with diplomatic missions to Pyongyang will  be for it and which countries will be against it. Almost all of Europe has some form of diplomatic mission with North Korea, meaning it leaves the EU in a bit of a predicament, not to mention its already established issues with creating a comprehensive EU foreign policy. Meanwhile, key American partners like Mexico, Brazil and Poland would all lose diplomatic standing with a country they deem worthy of having diplomacy with. The possibilities here are unfortunately infinite so finding an answer is difficult at this stage, but it is still an issue that needs addressing.

Critical Theory/Constructivism: This is easily the most complicated of the three theories available, not for the theory's fault, but rather because of the massive amounts of variables that need to be accounted for in order to even begin to make sense of a North Korean threat. First, there is the issue of figuring out where the North Korean people are left in this scenario. Nobody really knows for sure whether or not North Koreans truly love their country as much as North Korean state media tries to make it seem. This is because it's difficult to exit out of duress in order to make a liable complaint against a tyrannical government. So if violence were to overtake the North, it would be a crap-shoot as to what to expect from the North Korean populace. Another issue constructivists would have to deal with is what South Koreans would have to make of all this. Would they agree with chancing nuclear war? Would they even be willing to be involved in a war at all? What about Japan, would they feel dragged into a conflict they were not looking for? If that was the case what would be the ramifications of it all? 

Moving away from the question of civilians, another issue that pops up is what to do with the rest of the world. This situation is one that could very easily be spun to look like "another step in the history of American 'colonialization'" if the United States does succeed in a military advance. That is a public relations mine simply waiting for the United States in this day and age. While it may simply be a hindrance on the grassroots level, if the idea is picked up in the United Nations it could do some serious damage to any sort of multilateral effort if one exists. In terms of preventing any sort of conflict, constructivists have one ace up their sleeve; a gap between North Korean possible losses and South Korean possible losses. 

It is rather evident that South Korea has more to lose than North Korea when it comes to a direct confrontation, and while a successful South Korean incursion would eliminate a nuclear threat, putting a dependable economy and thriving cultural growth as collateral might scare off many. Politically speaking, it would be a hard sell to many South Koreans to engage in war with the North, regardless of spin. On the other hand you have a North Korean regime whose people are terribly subjugated and whose government has not shown any sort of care or responsibility for their well-being; essentially, North Korea has nothing to lose if it is indeed hellbent on following their dream of Korean unification under their flag. This is an issue for the constructivist because only one country, South Korea, plays with along with the constructivist's game, whereas North Korea simply does not give enough details about what sort of ideas are being pressed and which are being worked over to accurately make a prediction about conflict or at the very least be able to react to it.

As you can see, the three major theories up here are wrought with shortfalls. This of course is typical of most IR scenarios, but the fact that none of these three theories can either complement each-other to fill in the gaps and create a hybrid-theory as it were is what makes the North Korean issue difficult to say the least. On top of that, there is the "mad-man" issue with North Korea. That is to say that their secrecy and their supposed lunacy makes good news sound improbable and bad news sound imminent.

It is difficult to explain exactly why that is. It could be that there is little intelligence to go off of so natural cynicism takes over when dealing with international security issues. It could also be that because the Kim Jong Un regime is so much more effervescent than his father's that people are generally drawn towards being hostile from the get-go and leaving some of their reason at the door. It could even be due to an inclination to believe that there are really people in the world who are evil do-ers, control states with access to a nuclear arsenal and have a multitude of shark tanks in gold-laden halls. Whatever the reason, this more hostile North Korea has received a more thorough response than its more recent predecessor. I am no Pangloss, but I do believe that things happen for a reason. 

Not a divine reason, but a reason nonetheless. It could be because nobody has been able to strap down a reasonable course of action for North Korea, or it could be that there really is some sort of intelligence that is much more indicative of North Korean hostilities than other times before this. Whatever the case, the best ally in trying to figure out this issue is time. This is a hollow prescription, I grant that, but short of a divine intelligence miracle, it is the most promising one. With time we will be able to tell if North Korea is just sabre-rattling or if it is absolutely serious. Although the latter will be cutting it close, the information necessary will not come in one swoop, rather it will escalate as the tension does. At that point there will be the information necessary to put the issue to rest, hopefully without any military involvement. 

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What the Supreme Court Isn't Seeing in the Prop 8 Case and What it Should See

First reports coming back from the Supreme Court hearings today about same-sex marriage have started to outline a mixed court, a Supreme Court that seems to still be trying to find its way around the argument rather than trying to find its legality. The trouble seems to be not on interpretation of statutes or relating the issue to the true ideals of the founders. It is instead the issue of states’ rights, not the issue of gay marriage. That is to say, a decision will hang in the balance not because of civil rights, but instead on the never-ending battle between the federal and states’ government.

If you feel something is wrong with that picture, don’t worry, you’re right. The issue of what effect a Supreme Court ruling over the 50 states should be an important consideration to make, but it shouldn't be the consideration to make; the biggest consideration should be what sort of civil rights the Supreme Court, the main law of the land, can side with. Regardless of the outcome, the Supreme Court should now realize that this issue is not simply the questioning of the constitutionality of one state’s proposition, but is instead the most prominent civil right fight at the moment.

There is no easy way to get around this fact; a Supreme Court decision on same-sex marriage is going to have national ramifications. The main support for this is history itself. All major civil rights cases have left the jurisdiction of states’ rights advocacy and been put under the protection of the 14^th amendment by the federal government.  Roe v. Wade, Brown v. Board, Lawrence v. Texas, even Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission all qualify as potential if not outright state-driven and Supreme Court ruled civil rights decisions which were then extended to all 50 states.

The Supreme Court today unfortunately has shown a lack of leadership in this matter when the ball is clearly in their court. The justices have a specific job to do; keep the rest of the government in legal check all the while evaluating questions of fairness and equality for Americans, not just Californians or Virginians or Ohioans. This is especially true for issues regarding civil rights, where a country, not provinces or states, are entrusted to take a stance in order to make sure that the starting point of equality is the same regardless of where one is born or where their life takes them.

It is troubling to hear justices consider the validity of the suit or even questioning their agreement to hear the case. It is absolutely their responsibility to decide this issue now, given that the states themselves simply have not coalesced around a true definition of marriage. That in itself should be signal enough to the Supreme Court that their intervention is needed. Not that there needs to be a firm definition of marriage for everyone to use from now on until the end of time, rather that there needs to be a final decision taken one way or the other.

This is because this issue is older than Prop. 8. Homosexuality did not spring out of nowhere in 2008, it has been an issue that’s been around for a while now, circa beginning of human time. It is also an issue that has already been indirectly covered by some already on this Supreme Court. Simply because this issue is riding on the back of a fight to relieve a state-voted proposition doesn't make it more dynamic or introduce special barriers. Those barriers only exist if the justices are too politically preoccupied with balancing state and federal powers rather than address a civil rights issue, or if the justices think that American society is simply not ready for a ruling on the issue. I hope for the sake of putting this conflict to bed that neither of those options are true.

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If You Are Going to Scream "Fire" Make Sure There's Smoke

As your cable news networks will have told you in the past couple of days, Sen. Rand Paul and co. stood on the Senate floor this past Thursday to filibuster the confirmation of John Brennan as Secretary of Defense by talking for over 13 hours straight about the supposedly imminent threat of warrant-less drone strikes by the United States on American nationals on American soil. While it's a great sign that we have elected officials supporting our right to not be blown to smithereens (whatever those are) at the touch of a button, the whole episode is rather unsettling for a different reason.

You see, there is a significant portion of the population from all sorts of demographic backgrounds that simply distrusts the government, thinking its only reason for existence is to slowly chip away at citizens’ civil liberties. This line of reasoning has even led some to believe that the United States government is secretly plotting, at all times, to turn this beautiful experiment in democracy into a “V for Vendetta” style totalitarian government. I am here to say that this worry of an evil government is an unnecessary one. Additionally, if taken seriously at the national level, it is downright dangerous.

The worry is as unreasonable as Eric Holder’s response to Sen. Paul’s speech-a-thon was laconic. This is mainly because if the United States of America wanted to become the Totalitarian States of America, they would accomplish that goal in less time than it will take you to finish this article. The armament gap between the populace and all the branches of the military are such that a slow and gradual removal of civil liberties would plainly be too laborious and time consuming when compared to what a quick strike would do.

However, let’s indulge those who watch New York fashion week for the latest in tin-foil headgear. Let’s assume the United States indeed wants to limit civil liberties. If that were the case, we would have to honestly say that the United States has been failing tremendously at it. The entire history of the United States constitution is marked by a continuous stream of enlargement of civil liberties, first to the people who are to enjoy them and even the specific rights themselves. Aside from specific Supreme Court rulings and prohibition, the net result of rights granted to American citizens is largely positive. Logistically speaking, that’s bad news for anyone wanting to take away ever-increasing civil liberties.

So why is this talk dangerous? Should we not just leave it to those of us who read too many Tom Clancy books? Unfortunately, the more this sort of sentiment is picked up by those with an audience, or elected officials, or the media the more exposure it is going to get. The more exposure it gets, the more misinformed the electorate becomes, and a misinformed electorate is inherently detrimental to the democratic process.

To go out and present reason to wrongly fear the government for limiting civil liberties it may have also has physical consequences; for instance when President Obama announced intention to more effectively regulate gun-ownership in America there was a run on guns, and it’s not hard to foresee that more guns will always lead to more gun deaths, accidental or otherwise.

It’s important to mention that these sorts of negative externalities are not generated by the people who fear the government or not even necessarily their message. They are instead being generated by the element of fear in each individual that is tapped into whenever these claims are made. In a sense making these valueless claims is a bit like yelling “fire” in a crowded theater  It is very helpful when there is actually smoke present. But when there is no smoke, and therefore no fire, we would all appreciate it you kept it to yourself and allowed the rest of us to watch the movie.

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You Are Responsible for the Sequester

So the sequester came and went, and the apocalypse did not come after all. Although to be fair it probably did not happen because the Four Horsemen were furloughed, but that's another story. Up until the 2014 midterms, all Americans will hear will be attacks by both Democrats and Republicans as to who is responsible for the sequester. Politically speaking they will each have good points to make, but neither Democrats or Republicans are objectively responsible for the sequester or the fight or the budgeting that led to it. The sad truth is that Americans are wholesomely responsible for the mess in D.C.

That's right, the big fight in D.C. between political fat-cats and their ever present lobbyist friends have literally nothing to do with the fact that the sequester passed. Instead, it is the mix of an overwhelming anti-tax culture and a hidden approval of congressional discourse that has allowed for the U.S. Budget to turn into a political "telenovela" over the last 30 years.

I will begin with the most shocking of the two previous statements; Congress' approval. Congress is actually very well liked by the United States electorate. Congress overall might be lucky to have its approval rating hit the single digits but there is a more applicable approval rate, the local lawmaker approval rating, that should act as the metric by which congressional approval is measured. You see, ask anyone whether or not they support Congress and you are likely to get a resounding "no", at least that is statistically the case. Ask again whether or not that same person supports their local congressman or their respective senators and you will get a much higher chance of acceptance. Last I recall, in my high school civics class, the number floats between 40-50%, but that may vary on year and textbook.

Whatever the number, it makes sense that the generic local congressmen would have more approval than the whole of Congress simply because Congress as a whole still exists. It only took 12% of the Californian electorate to recall then Gov. Grey Davis, and while California is only one state, it goes to show that in practice it doesn't take many petition signatures to send lawmakers packing. Yet with such low approval ratings, Congress is still there today. The problem is that the Congress is made so that individual congressmen are only responsible to their constituency, not the whole country. What that means is that the overall congressional approval rating is in fact useless as a tool for motivating lawmakers into changing things. If anything, it shows that at the polls, there is a much higher candidate retention rate than the overall approval rating would suggest because those disenchanted with the whole of Congress cannot vote to remove all of Congress.

Unfortunately, voter laws and electoral politics are not the core of the reason why the sequester took shape the way it did. Voting laws provide the structure for which a Congress can be universally loathed yet remain in power election cycle after election cycle. The main driver for the sequester instead was a strong anti-tax culture that has been building in the United States ever since the Reagan years.

To clarify, "anti-tax" is a very broad term to play with here, so "anti-tax" in this case cannot simply mean someone who dislikes paying taxes. If that were the case then everyone in the world would fall into this category. What "anti-tax" means here is that there is not simply a dislike of not wrangling in more money on the margins, but that there is a deep moral obligation on the part of the "anti-tax" people to limit government government revenue out of some innate fear of the government having too many resources. To be "anti-tax" is to enter the tax conversation with the idea that the government 1) has no responsibilities to provide any social goods to its citizens 2) is inherently filled with people whose purpose is none other than to harm its citizens in some way 3) exists, by evidence of taxation, only to restrict personal autonomy.

That definition above is purposely set to the extremes not to embellish or ridicule those in this category, but instead to be able to cover all possible reasons of why someone would have a morally visceral reaction to increasing or even paying taxes. This is true of any population in any country, but in the United States at least, there is an elevated level of "anti-tax" sentiment that is, rather poetically, supported from the top and sustained in a trickle-down effect.

The system works like this; you have people like Grover Norquist who generate the organizational level of the "anti-tax" movement. They provide the firms and lobbying groups who create the message in neatly prepared and presentable package. They then find people in the general populace who either 1) are wealthy enough to enjoy a good "anti-tax" message or 2) those who are not at all terribly wealthy but are promised great financial things to come and rescue them from their current situation should they take up the message. Those two sorts of people are then both involved in supplying the public petitions, the Tea Party rallies, and the "Average Joe" soundbites politicians in Congress represent and, by way of electoral politics, must appease in order to maintain the afore-mentioned individual approval rating as high as it is. What's the best way to do this? Sign a tax-chastity pledge designed at the organizational level in order to prove your words with actions.

The end result is political gridlock not caused by party bickering or hateful congressional relationships but instead by electoral hand-tying. This process should come as no surprise to anybody who was paying attention to the details in the sequester fight leading up to the final hours before it finally kicked in. What is surprising is that within that fight, at no point was there ever an argument from the opposition saying that tax revenue was necessary to protect the autonomy of those who struggle financially through little fault of their own. Why this was the case is beyond me, but I can think of a reason why.

If you think about it, the origin story of the United States did not come from an angry set of gods or the spontaneous creation of land emerging from the sea; it came from a tea-soaked tax protest. Colonists went to war for lesser taxes just as much (some would argue more) as they did for human rights. Because of that, having a fear of the government or wanting lower taxes is seen as something patriotic instead of libertarian overkill. Because of this, even those on the left of the political-economic scale in the United States are afraid of touching the subject of tax hikes even if they would in theory provide necessary revenue for programs that truly help people that truly need the help.

That is the very unique issue that the United States has with its taxes. The issue of over-taxation or fraudulent government spending isn't as normal as it is in other countries because it takes root in the very foundation of the country and to some the very definition of being patriotic and perhaps American. Call it mob mentality or peer pressure, this isn't a phenomenon that has been lost over generations since the fight for independence, it is part of the American identity to be wary of taxes and where they go. It becomes a tragedy when those who stand to profit immensely from lower taxes at the top range exploit this soft-spot to favor their tax returns. 

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Italian Elections 2013; Here we go again!

The Italian elections are technically over but also technically still taking place and I figured I owe it to my rather accurate prediction a year and a half ago to come up with some sort of response/prediction hybrid to try and put things in perspective. Here are some key points I see as having a significant impact on Italy and the rest of Europe.

Whoever wins will not fix the struggles of Italians

It does not matter whether Bersani or Berlusconi win or at least get a majority coalition formed in this election because neither has made promises to help the struggling Italian. The former simply does not have the capacity or political capital to reduce the IMU on those who struggle to keep even their one and only house they own, while the latter wants to reduce the IMU by supposedly trimming state spending by 2% a year. 

The fact of the matter is the IMU tax should have been a great way of addressing two major issues in Italian state economics; unfair taxing practices and fiscal evasion. The IMU should have been a way to tax second or third homes (albeit have the acronym changed, but I digress) owned by those who can afford more than one house, theoretically the very well off as opposed to taxing everybody, including those least well off who still hung onto their one and only home. At the same time, the IMU would have acted as a litmus test to see who was actually paying taxes on their second and/or third homes. Tax evasion is a big problem in general but in Italy it goes beyond the revenue problem and becomes instead and issue of fairness on the part of the government. 

The IMU should have been a real arrow in the quiver of a state struggling for approval and trust on the part of the Italian people, and instead it turned into a farce. Whoever wins will not just ignore the good bits of an extended property tax, but in doing so will continue to ignore the real problem of the majority of Italians struggling with work and payments.

Whoever wins will not be liked by Angela Merkel

Let's be honest, Monti will not be making a repeat appearance in a new government. Although it was Berlusconi who pulled the rug out from underneath him, Monti never caught the public as he should have as a leader, technocratic or not, so he most likely will have to force his way into a coalition if he wants to remain politically relevant. That being said Monti really is the only candidate that Europe approves of, if only because his policies are free-market oriented and therefore entice more investor confidence than other candidates. 

If Bersani does come out on top, his communist roots may dissuade some from giving him the benefit of the doubt, but do keep in mind that the Communist Party did not join the PD coalition, but instead joined Ingroia's newly formed coalition. This really should come as no surprise given the fact that the PD has proven in recent months to be as "directly involved" with free-market banking as any real Italian political party should be. The Monte Paschi conspiracy isn't a good sign however, given the fragility of finance in Italy, meaning that should the whole of the PD be as disinterested with accounting for risk as they were with a single bank, it could mean more trouble.

But certainly no candidate other than Berlusconi truly creates such a negative effect to Italo-German relations. Eliminate the sexism and the girth-jokes thought to be the toast of the party at bunga-bungas of the past, Angela Merkel cannot possibly want to deal with Berlusconi again after his eccentricity nearly pushed Italy off the Euro and Germany with it. Considering also that the spread  seems to be positively related to Berlusconi's being in office, he simply carries too much baggage to deal with by any German chancellor.

Whichever party wins will have a tough time finding legitimacy in Parliament

The nature of the Italian government is such that coalitions must exist given the vast number of big-ticket special interests that fall everywhere along the left-right political spectrum. As this election has shown, there are three major groups of Italians; ones that find themselves to be alright at the current stage but can see room for improvement (PD voters), ones that morally live in the 18th century and would rather not pay any taxes (PDL voters), and ones that are sick and fed up of it all (Five Star voters). Unfortunately because these three groups almost evenly split the ballot, it means that Grillo's party holds the coalition tie-breaker. This is particularly frustrating when you add in the fact that Grillo has repeatedly said that he does not want to create a coalition, because that is the old way of doing things.

The fact of the matter is he will be forced to join a coalition because it is the only way a secondary vote can be avoided and the real way to make the PDL (the greater evil between the PD and PDL in Grillo's opinion) go away for a while. What that in effect means is that there will be a leftist-ish government in charge where half of the members think the other half is unprincipled and as dirty as the politically opposing party. Sound familiar? It should.

Grillo's Five Star party does sound good on paper, but it is inherently anti-government just like the Tea-Party in the United States, and we all have seen what Tea-Party representatives have done to the functionality of the American Congress. God only knows what sort of dysfunction awaits should Grillo be begrudgingly forced into a coalition for the sake of taking power away from Berlusconi and the PDL. If this does become a problem, and there is a rift in the Parliament and the whole government for that matter, we could be looking at another dissolution, perhaps sometime around the next big market scare if there is one. 

Is there anything good that can come out of this election?

I think that it's become easier and easier to be cynical about political prospects in Italy, if only because the negativity of it all has entered a predictable phase of feigned disinterest of political ambitions from the right only to have them come swooping back in with a solution to pent up social issues they will blame the left for. The fact of the matter is there is some hope in all this after all.

Let's assume Grillo decides to enter into a coalition with Bersani, and let's assume they don't hate each-other enough to have the coalition implode on itself. That could happen. Bersani just yesterday announced intention  to open up the gates of the PD to Grillo, even though the PD had won the most votes outright. This could be enough for Grillo to seriously consider asking for and importantly receiving most of his party's proposals to be accepted and integrated into the PD platform. 

That all depends however on how much people would not want to see Berlusconi get close to being in power again. If anything, this potential Bersani-Grillo partnership could finally answer the question as to whether or not Italians are able to put their political shadows to rest. If they beg for Grillo to join a coalition or at the very least forgive him for it, then they will be taking a step in the positive direction. If instead the political party remains bigger than the objective of running the country, then it will be a step in the other direction. 

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Moving the EU Forward with a Different Approach. Why the Lisbon Treaty is actually a step forward for Europe’s Security and Sense of Self

The Lisbon Treaty, What is it Good For? 

As of late, there have been numerous attempts by many to categorize the current EU situation as one of disarray and general chaos. While the outlook is not as cheerful as it may have been 10 or arguably five years ago, I'm still rather inclined to believe that the EU has life yet. Certainly, the Treaty of Lisbon has created a basis for the next chapter of EU history to be written, ironically on a subject few have dared to explore in the last 40 years. In this paper, I will argue that the Treaty of Lisbon does very well to advance European Security in three ways; turning the EU into one legal body increasing the efficiency of foreign relations, creating the External Action Service to better place the EU to the rest of the world, and finally putting defense and security in the EU conversation. By putting EU foreign relations and security at a new genesis point, the EU has the potential to craft a new mission of global peace and to preserve the values it has already acquired.

Legal Efficacy; Turning the EU Whole

The treaty itself begins to shape EU foreign policy at the very core of its structural level by condensing all three older pillars of EU governance into one legal body. What this basically means is that up until the Lisbon Treaty, EU foreign policy (CFSP) was considered a separate body from all European Communities, as well as strangely the Police and Judicial Cooperation Pillar. The CFSP's detachment prior to the Lisbon Treaty created "an uncertain international status" (Verola) stemming from the lack of a coherent message. On its own, the CFSP was rather vaguely tasked with trying to encourage member states to develop similar foreign policy if only to try to streamline interactions with other member states and most importantly not create unnecessary conflicts.

Clearly, this was in no way an effective method at actually establishing a foreign policy of any kind. Although the member states reserved the right to create their own foreign policies and establish national strategy as they do today, using the CFSP as a type of registrar for the member states made it a misnomer at best for European solidarity and security. Although the CFSP was able to try to draw member states into a coherent European international message, "there [were] no legal sanctions for failing to comply with common positions" (Hix and Høyland). By integrating the CFSP into the "single pillar system" under the Lisbon Treaty, it gives the EU a greater command over determining common foreign policy, both figurative and practical.

The former comes in the form of creating a framework for actual policy making and accountability on the member states, like the solidarity clause which considers an attack on any member state as an attack on the consolidated EU body. The latter takes shape in international talks, as the EU is no longer an observer to the United Nations but is now a member with speaking privileges (Council Spokesperson Legal Service ESDP Missions, 7/20/2011) as it is one whole legal body. The streamlining that is made because of the Lisbon treaty is rather immense compared to the vision of the Maastricht Treaty 10 years ago.

External Action Service: The Legitimization of EU Foreign Affairs

Perhaps the most controversial (at least at the moment) aspect of the Lisbon Treaty relies around the creation of the External Action Service. This separate new institution takes the place of the old CFSP pillar in the sense that it has many of the original CFSP goals and responsibilities still apply to the EAS. The difference however is that the EAS is given through the Lisbon treaty the ability to act as a "diplomatic service" (Hix & Høyland) which the former CFSP could not, even with the Amsterdam revisions proposed in 1999. As the EAS is run by an appointed High Representative directly from the Council under consultation from the Commission, its position is one that like the CFSP relates to the member states, but still serves the EU's common interests.

The EAS is therefore a new understanding, much like the "pillar restructuring", to the responsibilities of the EU specifically in the area of foreign policy. It is designed to not open itself up to the same criticism as the CFSP for being too divided or not as important as the first pillar was (Hobbing, 7/19/2011). Its new powers clearly move it into the direction of greater autonomy. Proof of this very fact can be seen in the controversy it has managed to stir in its bureaucratic infancy. Lady Catherine Ashton who serves as Vice-President of the Commission as well as High Representative for the EAS has received her fair share of criticism for not upholding the "right of initiative" (Verola) aspect of her post [1]

Because she is acting in part to accommodate the needs of the Council of the EU, her job consists of checking off with all member states regarding any critical issue, making emergency situations very difficult to deal with in terms of responding within a given time frame. An example of this was the backlash she received for not taking a more publicly active role after the Haiti Earthquake in 2010 (Bork) even though her interaction with U.S Secretary of State Hillary Clinton advised her to simply send aid rather than an envoy. Yet that in itself still does outline the responsibilities to the member states that in some sense hinder the actions of the EAS. However, I still maintain that the foundation of the EAS, even with the oversight of the member states is a great leap forward in EU foreign policy and understanding EU involvement abroad. The EU has a track record of many international involvements regarding peaceful and humanitarian operations (Hix), so there is no problem of will.

The problem that does exist is the public relations problem of not having a main face of EU foreign policy which plagues most of the EU itself. There are some main advantages to having created the EAS that will work to reverse this problem. The first comes straight from the politics involved in choosing the high representative. Because both the Council and the Commission have a say in deciding the High Representative, the opportunity for political theatre over a position that will inevitably need to stick to a common script down the line provides a public relations win for the whole of the EU, and gives a major boost to the reception of EU foreign policy amongst those in or outside of the EU. A second advantage is the very fact that there is now a figurehead at the top of the EAS that can actually be referred to for any foreign relation problem, specifically any crises that may arise. The stock of presidents that the EU currently has for the Presidency, sitting President of the Council, or President of the Commission is acceptable (not necessarily ideal however) for internal issues that can allow for time to pass before their resolution (things such as trade or commerce laws).

Foreign policy however needs to be able to respond much more quickly and with a certain gravitas in order to claim legitimacy. The EAS helps this need out by creating a framework for all future foreign relations communications to come out quickly and efficiently. Much is said about Lady Ashton currently having to be approved by all the member states before making an announcement and therefore slowing down the process (Cirtautas, 8/1/2011) but that is because there is very little precedent to jump off of at the moment. Because the EAS is tasked to package and categorize common EU foreign policy interests, every outside stimuli adds another piece of information to the greater common EU knowledge base, making every action after the other much easier to digest and react to. Unless there are serious upheavals in member states' governments and ideas regarding foreign policy, the common EU policy will continue to dictate a general first response on the part of the EAS.

Beyond Legal Unity

The most striking of the Lisbon Treaty change is, like most attempts by the EU to gain legitimacy, symbolic in nature. What the combined efforts of the legal merger of the three Maastricht Pillars and the creation of the EAS generate is an environment to fit what over the last decade has become a louder aspect of the EU; combined security efforts. During the Cold War, European Security never became a great issue because of NATO's presence and the one clear Russian threat. However, ever since the Soviet Collapse and the European "military enlightenment" that was the Kosovo Mission in 1999 (Pinder), the topic of European Defense became harder to ignore. This is emphasized by the level of commitment every new mission has received on the part of the EU in terms of sheer numbers of volunteers sent in, both civilian and military (Keukeleire).

By merging the CFSP into the rest of the EU, the Lisbon Treaty legally ties foreign relations with security and defense as one whole body under the communication of the EAS. The result is a combination of both CFSP and ESDP efforts under one legal entity (Pirozzi & Sandawi). Although the immediate effects are bureaucratic in nature, the possibilities that this bond creates for future EU foreign policy is an enticing and unpredictable development. For the first time the EU can begin to better articulate its humanitarian missions; more importantly it may see an initiative that is key to EAS policy and could bolster it with direct involvement of its security efforts. It also makes the EU more prepared to deal with conflicts that could possibly arise on Europe's front door like the Arab Spring or oddly enough territorial rights to the Arctic (Nemitz, 7/18/2011) which could call upon a simultaneous deployment of both diplomats and humanitarian forces/ peacekeepers.

The Lisbon Treaty is in no way however creating a NATO alternative. Although many question its use or identity in the years after the fall of the Soviet Union (Economist), its existence is not short lived in the European Defense psyche. The rise of right wing governments and public sentiments in the member states is an early indication that NATO will continue to play a large role in regional stability for years to come. But the EU is now on the path of being able to provide perhaps not a substitute to NATO but a corollary EU defense policy similar to that of the Pleven and Fouchet plans (Keukeleire).

But is it a Real Change from Business as Usual?

So the Lisbon Treaty does manage to make certainly significant changes to the previous foreign policy and defense structure of the EU. But the worrying prospect for most is not so much that a change has occurred, but rather the way in which it has occurred. Effectively merging the EAS and ESDP under a common directive is a good idea; more consolidation leads to more efficacy. But only to a certain extent. The EAS functions much like the U.S State Department (as a diplomatic wing) while the ESDP functions instead like the U.S Department of Defense (as a military wing). Although connected, both are departments that require huge amounts of dedication and effort just to be run separately; the merging of the pillars under the Lisbon Treaty then seems to have actually caused more strain on both wings because of a quantifiable lack of leadership and direction because only one High Representative chairs both.

If the Lisbon Treaty really was aiming for efficacy and streamlining, a more rational method of combining forces could have been to still create an EAS that focused on centralizing European foreign policy by overseeing both the former CFSP and ESDP, without having to actively chair both. The pillars as they were could have been given separate legal status so that they could effectively have the same powers they do now, but maintain the internal structure and policies that they had beforehand. With enhanced powers, enhanced legal status, and an office from the Commission that worked to consolidate the work and not the agencies, the Lisbon Treaty could have avoided many hassles that are beginning to appear after its inception.

One Must Learn to Walk Before Running

The question of efficacy though is perhaps skewed by a difference in understanding what the Lisbon Treaty was created to do. Undoubtedly the Lisbon Treaty sought efficacy, but there is a stronger case to believe that it sought progress. The merging of the "two pillars" was not a decision stemming from luxury or governmental aesthetics, nor was it simply to give legal status to a wing of foreign affairs. It clearly was an attempt to promote a rethinking of European foreign affairs and security by showing that the two disciplines were not and should not be so far apart. Again, the discussion currently relates around the idea of EU collapse or EU irrelevancy.

These problems are not solved by marginally increasing powers to certain facets of government; they are solved by approaching the question of government in a different light. When Keukeleire entitles his chapter with the words "From Taboo to a Spearhead of EU Foreign Policy", he is not using rhetoric to make his article stand out, he is describing a recent reality. In order for the EU to remain relevant, it must begin to play a much more active and centralized role on the world stage and that particular endeavor begins by creating a face for the EU; the EAS. Some questions about Lady Ashton and her leadership still remain. She perhaps has acted as a catalyst for the argument that the position as head of the EAS is too overreaching and too overbearing for one individual by her missteps (EU) and misrepresentations in the media (EUX.TV). But her less than perfect performance can be simply attributed to the political choice made to appoint her by not the Commission but instead the 27 member states who would rather see the EAS limited in centralizing foreign affairs and defense (BBC).

Regardless, the structure put in place by the Treaty of Lisbon is one that is as symbolic as it is progressive. For the EU, the coupling of the former CFSP and ESDP was seen as much more necessary than organizational efficacy. Historically speaking, many of the current EU institutions began as weakened versions of the current lot, once destined to be either irrelevant or short lived. But like the Parliament and the European Court of Justice, the EAS will be justified and then later expanded to accommodate the new responsibilities.

What is the Lisbon Treaty Good For? Why, the Future of the Whole EU.

The Treaty of Lisbon did not mean to impose a "silver bullet" for the foreign affairs question of the EU. Treading on the grounds of foreign affairs and security has always been a difficult affair when negotiating with the member states. Their claims of sovereignty are still very loud and rarely challenged by any EU institution (Chmielewski), making solidarity in any EU centralization effort very difficult. It instead was chartered to introduce this new way of thinking, and most importantly legally setting it as precedent that the EU was going to take foreign affairs and security as a more central mission than before. Because of this, even the structural setbacks of the Lisbon Treaty do not hinder it from being a true step forward for European integration.

Works Cited

Ashton, C. (2011). A world built on co-operation, sovereignty, democracy and stability. Corvinus University. Budapest: European Union.

BBC . (2009, November 20). EU foreign head dismisses critics. Retrieved August 5, 2011, from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8367589.stm

Bork, J. (2011). The European Union - A General Introduction to the EU. Brussels: EU Commission.

Chmielewski, K. (2011, August 4). Visit to the Polish Permanent Presidency 2011. (U. 2. Program, & A. Regio, Interviewers)

Council Spokespoerson Legal Service ESDP Missions. (2011). Discussion about the Council of the EU. Brussels: Council of the EU.

EUXTV. (2009, November 20). Ashton Grilled by Media on Qualifications as EU Foreign Minister. Brussels, Belgium.

Hix, S., & Hoyland, B. (2011). The Political System of the European Union. New York: Palgrave McMillan.

Hobbing, P. (2011). Brussels Basics. EU Symposium 2011. Brussels.

Keukeleire, S. (2010). European Security and Defense Policy: From Taboo to a Spearhead of EU Foreign Policy. In F. Bindi, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (pp. 51-72). Washington D.C: The Brookings Institute.

Nemitz, P. (2011). Integrated Maritime Policy. EU Symposium 2011. Brussels.

Pinder, J., & Usherwood, S. (2007). The European Union: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford Press New York.

Pirozzi, N., & Sandawi, S. (2008). Five Years of ESDP in Action: Operations, Trends, Shortfalls". European Security Review, 39, pp. 14-17.

Verola, N. (2010). The New EU Foreign Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon. In F. Bindi, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (pp. 41-50). Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution.

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[1] The “right of initiative” basically prescribes a vaguely based right of autonomy within EAS proceedings and policy making. This grants the independence that the EAS needs in order to be a leading force of foreign affairs.  

Response to Peace Pact by David C. Hendrickson “Evaluating the Realities of a Federative System”

In Peace Pact, Hendrickson works to argue that the best way of achieving true peace is through a system of application of shared security. His model for this is the foundation of the federal system in the infancy of the United States and how that incorporation of different political entities with a moral claim to sovereignty, the states, into a union able to also morally claim significant sovereignty not only over itself but also over members of the union. Hendrickson does note that federalism takes on many if not theoretically infinite forms of balance between "state" and "federal" power (if we are to take this balance as a sliding scale between two extremes, one being "state" and the other being "federal").

Further into his argument, he claims that the best possible form is one where the emphasis of security is placed further on the side of "state" security than on "federal" security in order to avoid the pitfalls of realism (which would lead to appeasing the security concerns generated by the system and not necessarily the actors) and complete hegemony (which would by definition curtail rights of individuals within each state). In order for Hendrickson's argument to hold its own however, there will need to be some review of whether or not his intention to put emphasis on state and individual security actually coincides with state and individual motives for security; put simply, the rationale behind what gives moral backing to a certain system of security must be a response to the motives and ideas of actors (state and/or individuals), otherwise there is too great a detachment between the need for security and the physical security itself. The risk here then is that not only is the full worth of the  individual sidestepped but the creation of a federal union begins to look increasingly more like a modernized version of bandwagoning among members of the union, all vying to gain the most benefits for the least amount of costs.

                                                                             

However, before any consideration is made to evaluate Hendrickson's argument, it would prove useful to be able to describe it in the best detail possible. To do this, it is important to note some general axioms that Hendrickson will be working with in order to ground his argument. One of these axioms is the idea that people generally if not exclusively look out for their own security and the security of their property. That being said, it is also a general axiom that people tend to congregate in some manner in order to provide a better route to gain said security. Hendrickson's argument here is technically an elaborate extension of the "state of nature" thought process with regards to individuals. The specific change here is that he is applying libertarian principles to foreign policy, specifically how states should see each other given the fact that the interests of the individuals have a moral standing such that they should be preserved. 

Hendrickson is quick to point out two polar opposites of world organization among states, that of International Anarchy (IA) and that of Universal Empire (UE). The two concepts are simple to understand; IA is focused solely on a "state of nature" amongst states, with varying degrees of cooperation along its spectrum, whereas UE is the "Hobbesian" answer of a sovereign government that rules others in the world in order to avoid problems. Each model however has significant blocks to rights of individuals.

IA has far too much conflict sewn into its system's fiber to ensure any sort of peace of mind, let alone establish the right amount of security of one's person and belongings. Even in times of alliance and relative peace (should Locke's state of nature be taken over Hobbes'), the uncertainty of a system ripe for war would itself lower quality of individual rights, and make them almost null and void (what is the point of embracing these rights if at any moment they could be trampled upon in times of war?).

UE on the other hand has the general fear that the bigger a government gets and the more rights it claims in order to properly function under its own decree the less rights individuals will actually have and less power will be had by those rights that do filter through if any at all. In Hendrickson's comparative model, individuals are essentially caught between a rock and a hard place when it comes to protecting their rights from the volatility of a truly international system. In looking at one direction they see war and strife, whereas in the opposite they see limited rights and a possible oppressive government.

It is at this point that Hendrickson points out, much to the joy of these troubled individuals, that this spectrum is not the only possible system on which an international order can run on. In fact, there is historical evidence found in the exact founding of the United States that provides a blue print for how to approach such dire security concerns. More so, when this system is blown up to scale the international order, even that of today, the different components fit in to size the bigger and more robust groups without changing the impact on individual rights. Hendrickson here of course is talking about a federal system of government that sprung up in the soon-to-be states of the United States.

A federal union was not to be founded on conflict or control, but rather on only cooperation, such that rights of the individual would be then forced to take center stage. Even at the time of the creation of these circumstances, this realization was felt in of all places, Great Britain, where Burke recognized the ultimate struggle between legitimacy of government and individual freedom (Hendrickson 86) was heading on a collision course with state interests; in this case his own. Perhaps more crucially was the recognition on the part of the colonials themselves of this very fact and the subsequent worry of how exactly to get various colonies, each with their own unique demographics, social organization, and political ambitions to avoid " 'discord and total disunion' " (Hendrickson, Dickinson, 108).

Epistemological epiphanies aside, the course for federalization was set in the hopes of preventing the colonies from devolving into either IA by allowing their lot in the new world to remain a European playground (or worse have the colonies turn forces on themselves) or into UE under British rule. To anchor the logistical push for a federal system, a moral ground was taken with regards to what philosophy best embodied the interests of the union as well as the interests of the individuals within it. Classical realism to the founders obviously was out of the question given who they were fighting against, and Kantian Perpetual Peace, while very attractive, did not address the issue of separate states and their willing  "cooperation while not submitting" (Hendrickson 270) to a higher union. Although this was the general case in the colonies at the time, the way that history turned out to be showed precisely how awkward this system would have been had it been implemented in the colonies.

With social and political bickering across colonial lines, the effect of "automatic cooperation" as Kant described it would not have worked. So instead the founders adopted an idea of an "international society", one where states are treated in a way that turns them into knowledgeable, cost-effective, and poised actors on the world stage (Hendrickson 278). This may at first sound a bit utopian in nature, but it is the only theory regarding international relations that could actually foster a healthy federal union, mainly because again, the tenets of "good faith, sovereignty, and peaceful settlement of disputes" reflects the morality of individual rights. With this piece, Hendrickson comes full circle from his discussion of the histories of the founding of the United States to his ultimate goal of embracing a theory of international relations that embodies the push for a robust protection of individual rights.

In order to place individual rights at the top of any sort of international organization of states, there must be a push for a federal union among states who value individual rights. More importantly, in order for this said union to not fall apart, it must live in a world where the major actors, crucially those who support it, act in concert with an "International Society" that extends the moral force of individual rights into what would otherwise be a "global state of nature" among states. Without this construct, individual rights would either or cease to exist under a strongman's government, or count for nothing in a world filled with perpetual war.

The main problem with Hendrickson's argument is two-fold; a primary concern regarding logistics and then a secondary concern regarding the true intentions of the call for security given the lapses in logistics. To address the first part of the objection, we must again divide the load in two. The first problem with the logistics of Hendrickson's argument concerns the feasibility of creating a true federal union. Hendrickson uses the United States as a shining example of what people can do if they truly embody the spirit of shared security through federal union, but a great deal of credit for that happening must be given to the general cohesiveness of American culture. Creating a federal union requires that a lot of trust be given to other individuals and groups within the union, much more so at least than the IA or UE models. Keeping that in mind, it is a lot easier to trust people who are culturally similar than others who may be culturally distant.

This is not to say that some cultures cannot handle the prospects of federal union, rather that xenophobia is part of every culture to some extent and effects of "othering" (the generation of an outside and consequently strange, untrustworthy, not completely equal group by the prime-group that identifies itself as superior for self justifying reasons) will always make giving trust to other cultural groups difficult. This is made especially worse if there are historical dark spots between two different cultures or states.

However, even if there was to be an effort of reconciliation between two cultures that managed to instill full trust, the prospects of trying to work across different languages and cultures makes the logistical feasibility much harder than trying to work within only one culture. The United States were fortunate in this case because although the North-South split was becoming apparent well before the Civil War, there was no language divide, nor was there a problem of identification as something other than Americans, only their sense of rights divided an otherwise homogenous group.

The second and more structural problem that Hendrickson stumbles upon is the question of what a federal union actually happens to become once it is installed. Hendrickson generally proposes that the success of shared security among the United States is that states with their own declared sovereignty and peoples who identified themselves as part of those particular groups based on their own personal geo-political locations willingly decided to fall under the wings of a much greater power in search for security and stability, and more so to avoid future conflict.

More still, the creation of this coalition between independent states and a greater power also established a signal of alliance against outside powers looking to expand their own lands and holdings. Hendrickson calls this a federative system, but it sounds terribly close to an effect of  "bandwagoning" (term reserved for when small states who cannot ensure their own safety form security blocks under a greater organizational power in order to increase regional security and deter possible attacks from outsiders). Just because the United States federal government was not an established state itself, it acted as one byways of constitutional connection to all the individual states. If anything, the federative system that Hendrickson talks about is actually the world's most condensed episode of bandwagoning, where the coalition of states in an alliance form the greater power and presently give political acceptance of its greater collective security.

If this is the case, then the states did not form a union in order to cooperate, but instead formed the union ad-hoc given that there was no other major power to align with on the continent to sway away the remaining Spanish, French and British settlements in North America. For the states, the only way to create regional security was not to cooperate in establishing a federal union, but instead to construct quite literally from scratch a political entity that could be big enough to rival the European powers still left on the continent, but that could not in any way turn on the small states given its hollow, state-less structure.

Given these flaws of unfeasibility amongst Hendrickson's argument, it follows that not only is the structure of the argument wrong, but so too is the actual intention of creating this flawed "federative system". Without a real sense of cooperation, we cannot go on to say that the founders followed any sort of "international Society" when thinking about international relations, rather they followed a strict Realist structure where the state level security was placed above the security of the individual , clearly not embodying the libertarian tenets of personal freedom and independence. The federative system that is shown here is not one that embodies the need to establish some sort of accountability on the part of the individuals that make up the state, but instead it is one that recognizes more traditional Realist threats like issues of balance of power and relative strength among North American powers.

Historically it makes sense that the founders would tend to side more often than not within the mode of International Anarchy given what they knew about the threats of a Universal Empire. Although IA was the other side of the same coin, it was the side of the coin that the states felt more capable of controlling at their own will; put simply, it is easier to manage a system that one adapts to the structure of the states (establish an American influenced system of states in North America) than a system that forces structures of the states to mold into place. More broadly, any sort of federative system that emulates what happened in the United States runs a real risk of becoming a bandwagoning system as well.

In fact, in a system of states where language and culture act more as dividers instead of connectors, identifying an outside threat could fill that slot to motivate countries to come together, but once that idea is established, the importance of the security system switches immediately from protecting individual rights to protecting states from falling prey to outside threats, and the switch from cooperation to IA is complete.

There is however one major consideration to be observed before Hendrickson's argument can be fully measured to either immediately pertain to individual rights or not. Hendrickson's system may very well bend to the stimuli of a system that embodies IA, especially when it may not be the decision of the federal union being created to do so (if nobody else is willing to see the world any differently, deciding to not "play by the rules" could leave any political entity at a disadvantage). But even though it may bend, it does not take anything away from its primary objective of protecting individual rights, mostly because it is an ends-based approach, not a means-based approach. Essentially, if the state is secure, then so too are the rights and security of the individuals that live inside it, and so the motivation for security and the motivation for establishing a federative system still remains that which protects individual interests.

Whether or not the world around the federative system chooses to act in a more traditionally belligerent fashion does not matter, so long as the state that is established manages to end up with a place that respects individual rights then the security system is a success. With that in mind, it is possible to see just how even by appeasing the state-level interests and not directly approaching the individual level interests a federative system is able to have a true moral backing of its mission to protect individual rights. With a secure state comes also the possibility to embrace whatever sort of international theory structure the state wants to uphold, in the case of the colonies the "International Society".

Crucially, a structure like the "International Society" would have a hard time upholding its values of acting in good faith and resolving issues peacefully in a shark-tank as it were, so generating enough state-level security by way of a federative system creates a necessary positive feedback loop that propagates the core of an "International Society". Better still a core bent on understanding and good faith would also make great strides in alleviating the pressures of cultural differences should a federative system be adopted in less homogenous zones of humankind, thereby relieving some of the feasibility concerns related to the simple logistics of the federative system. This is not to say that a federative system with an applied "International Society" structure behind it would cure all cultural differences; it would simply make them small enough to not affect the entire system, leaving it just as strong as if there were no differences to begin with.

So in essence, the protection of the state at the state level is not something to bludgeon Hendrickson's argument, but rather something with which scope can be used to understand precisely what gives it moral gravitas. At the end of the day, if the main goal is to protect individual security, then the means by which one arrives at such an end (unless of course truly objectively evil) become mere sideshows pitted against the main attraction. With state security comes individual security, and with individual security comes the ability to safely choose what sort of theory of international relations is the most beneficial to a culture that values acts of good faith and peaceful solutions rather than being forced to adapt to whatever structure has developed outside the borders. That is the true motivation behind what creates freedom in this sort of structure, that by choosing it individuals coming together can choose what their own world, in this case their world of international relations, looks like rather than being slaves to its own whim, even as brutish and vicious as it may be.

This may very well be the loophole through which Hendrickson makes his argument work even when the perspective of analysis is changed from individual level to state level, but overall the argument really cannot stand against the strong connection between his federative system and ad-hoc bandwagoning. Ignoring the true moral intentions of the founders aside, which in reality cannot be completely inferred by their actions but only partially inferred, the establishment of the United States which held many powers over individual states would make little sense if the true goal of each and every state was sovereignty through individual rights. If individual rights were the main concern of each state then willfully submitting to a power greater than the states themselves would have been erroneous to say the least considering the states' collective knowledge accumulated as colonies regarding power structures and regional sovereignty.

Instead, it makes much more sense to approach the founding of the United States as the founding of a friendly pole of power for the smaller states in a rather nasty neighborhood at the time. In essence, all federations come about in this manner, when smaller states that need a heightened level of security but cannot bandwagon with other poles of influence in their immediate vicinity for whatever reason come together to form a "shadow pole of influence".

The roots of modern Germany are found in the exact same circumstances as those of the early American states; surrounded by powers much greater than themselves, the German speaking states in central Europe in 1815 formed a federation in order to create some stability and security in an otherwise very hostile part of the world. Surely, the individual security was heightened for the people of the states that took part of the first Confederation and the North German Confederation that followed it, but in both cases the central security of the states came before any mention of constitution making or traditional federalization. To add more to the list of commonalities between American and German federalization, out of the security pact, a new nation was born, that of Germany which before was only contested between Prussia and Austria. The same happened with the United States where being an "American" came into light well after the War of Independence.

All these pieces of evidence make it rather clear that the focus of federalization was never to establish security for individuals and their rights; if that had been the case then federalized Germany would have adopted a form of government with a more robust  idea of suffrage which would have prevented the North German Confederation to become an empire. If Hendrickson's case for a federative system then in some way needs or implies the state to develop a humanist essence, then it does not explain why late 19th century Germany was able to federalize and not develop such an essence. Instead, if federalizations are more pre-occupied with creating a custom-built pole of influence in a Machiavellian world, then it does not matter what the individual level security forms into (regarding individual rights of either citizens or subjects) so long as the states are preserved in the ad-hoc bandwagoning effect. If that is indeed the case, then federalizations cannot claim any moral justification from preserving individual rights; considering that Hendrickson’s argument does not have a response for this charge built into his analysis of the federalization of the first American states, his ultimate argument of what federalization truly wants to create in terms of security fails.

Works Cited

Hendrickson, David C., Peace Pact: the Lost World of the American Founding, The University Press of Kansas, 2003, Lawrence, Kansas